

~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA / WIND 701003



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 3 October 1970

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.


For the President Only

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SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1970


Weekly average for each month



JULY-OCTOBER 1970


Weekly data as reported

US BATTLE DEATHS




dropped sharply to 39 from last week's 63.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS




rose to 214 from last week's 182. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.

INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE




stand at zero for the week. With the dropping of one previously reported group, the total number of infiltrators since 23 October 1969 is estimated to be 65,000 - 66,500.

ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS




declined to 539 after two weeks at 597.

ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION



increased slightly to 1,466 from last week's 1,457.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS



as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces rose to 82% from last week's 75%

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

A flurry of minor enemy harassing attacks in northern and central South Vietnam at week's end climaxed a week of very low enemy-initiated activity. The Communists, however, continue preparations for the second phase of the current campaign, but local difficulties should cause further slippage in their timetable. Future enemy activity is expected to be restricted to shellings, harassment, and terrorism conducted by local force and guerrilla units.

In north Laos, because of stiff enemy resistance only limited progress has been made by Operation COUNTERPUNCH forces attempting to improve the government's positions south of the Plaine des Jarres prior to the end of the rainy season. To the south, friendly units continue to hold PS 26, a tactically important site on the eastern edge of the Bolovens Plateau, against enemy harassing fire. Meanwhile, the Communists are reacting to the government's interdiction efforts against Communist lines of communication by deploying additional forces to the threatened areas.

The threat to the 20-battalion Cambodian relief column strung out along Route 6 in the Tang Kouk area appears to have increased with the deployment of an additional enemy regiment to the area. In the northwest, enemy activity is on the increase in Battambang Province while to the southwest, security of Route 4 from the capital to Kompong Som has deteriorated to the point that the road is closed during the hours of darkness. Recent harassing attacks on most major lines of communication have seriously impeded the government's mobility.

Enemy Infiltration

The group mentioned in last week's report is no longer considered valid and has been dropped from the infiltration estimate. Thus, no new four-digit South Vietnamese bound infiltration groups have been detected for nearly six weeks. The total number of infiltrators since 23 October 1969 is now estimated at 65,000-66,500.

Infiltration groups with unusual designators continue to appear. Since 9 September, ten such groups have been detected, with a total strength of over 5,000. No positive connection has yet been made, but it seems increasingly likely that these groups represent elements of three NVA regiments which have been detected moving southward within North Vietnam. Although the final destination of these regiments is unknown, one of them may be enroute to the DMZ area to replace a unit which left there recently. The other two regiments could be headed for southern Laos to augment or protect the logistics system in the Laos Panhandle.

South Vietnam Developments

There is some danger that President Thieu will take ill-advised action against opposition Lower House deputy and publisher Ngo Cong Duc that would be very likely to stir up the sort of controversy and criticism from abroad which surrounded Thieu's heavy-handed handling of the Tran Ngoc Chau case last spring. Duc has publicly proposed a coalition to organize elections, called for a fifth delegation at the Paris talks composed of South Vietnamese peace advocates, and 25X1C
advocated the total withdrawal of U.S. and Allied forces.

25X1C while he did not want the executive branch to take steps to jail Duc, he intended to see that the National Assembly took action to remove Duc from the Lower House. 25X1C
However, since it is unlikely that the Lower House will move to oust Duc, Thieu may, out of frustration, take actions that will raise once again the charge that he is a repressive dictator. Indeed, the government has already mounted demonstrations against Duc, and Duc's newspaper will be facing court action for publishing his peace plan. Since Duc is both a legislator and a newspaper publisher, he could become a rallying point in the U.S. for forces unsympathetic to the GVN. Thieu's sensitivity to any criticism of his handling of the peace settlement is also indicated by reports that he plans to have Tran Ngoc Chau retried if, as expected, the Supreme Court overthrows Chau's conviction.

Communist Developments

Considerable evidence has now been received confirming that Madame Binh's 17 September Paris proposal was indeed part of a wide-ranging scenario aimed primarily at generating peace sentiments in the U.S. and South Vietnam. Numerous Communist military and Party messages directing the indoctrination of cadre on the proposal have pointed out that it was aimed at international and American public opinion and that the troops should be instructed to avoid "illusions of peace" and to focus on upcoming military tasks. In addition, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has provided what he says are notes on COSVN Directive 27 dealing with the Communist proposal in Paris. The Directive, issued nearly three weeks before Madame Binh's proposal, calls for accelerated military, political, and proselyting efforts in support of diplomatic moves, and warns that the war will be determined on the battlefield and not at the conference table.

Meanwhile, the Communists this week employed several channels in an effort to portray themselves as a force for peace and to stimulate peace pressures stemming from the 8-point proposal. Xuan Thuy told a Vietnamese exile on 26 September that the 8 points were "flexible" and only a "base for discussion." Two knowledgeable Polish officials in conversations with Americans have promoted Madame Binh's proposal as a "serious initiative" and an "important development" that merits close U.S. attention. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Soviet Party leader Brezhnev in a speech on 2 October stated that the proposals had met "with full approval and understanding in the Soviet Union" and asserted that it was now up to the U.S. to make an "appropriate" response.

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